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THE NEW DUE PROCESS LIMITATION IN PHILIP MoRRIS: A
CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE RULE BASED ON PRIOR
ADJUDICATION
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Supreme Court continued its current trend of ratcheting
up the constraints on punitive damages awards.' In Philip Morris USA v.
Williams,2 the Court considered whether the Due Process Clause permits
a jury to base its punitive damages award on the defendant's harm to
third parties not named in the suit. The Court held that punitive damages
cannot punish a defendant for injuries inflicted upon strangers to the liti-
gation.3 The majority opinion softened the effect of this rule in dicta,
however. It stated that a plaintiff can present evidence of the defendant's
harm to nonparties when it demonstrates reprehensibility.4 In effect, the
Court allows a jury to consider indirectly the defendant's harm to third-
parties (i.e., when it speaks to reprehensibility) but forbids a more direct
link (i.e., punishing a defendant for similar wrongful acts against others).
As this comment presents, the distinction the Court drew is illusory
and problematic. The Court identified a fundamental problem in allow-
ing a plaintiff to present evidence about the defendant's behavior toward
non-litigants: third-parties can and should bring claims on their own and
the defendant should have every opportunity to refute those claims.5 The
court's solution, however, created a flawed standard that will spawn fu-
ture problems.
Part I of this comment summarizes the history of punitive damages
leading up to the conflict in Philip Morris. Part II discusses the specifics
of the case, including the facts, procedural history, and majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part III analyzes the majority opinion and points out
the potential problems of the decision. It concludes with a suggested rule
which is less confusing and yet balances the competing interests.
1. Nathan Seth Chapman, Punishment by the People: Rethinking the Jury's Political Role in
Assigning Punitive Damages, 56 DuKE L.J. 1119, 1144 (2007) (noting that the Court began "adding
some muscle and flesh" to the Due Process Clause for restricting punitive damages in 1996).
2. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
3. Id. at 1063.
4. Id. at 1064.
5. Id. at 1063; see Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 654-55 (2003); see
also Rachel M. Janutis, Fair Apportionment of Multiple Punitive Damages, 75 Miss. L.J. 367, 373-
74 (2006).
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I. BACKGROUND OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Foundation of and Justifications for Punitive Damages
Ancient civilizations incorporated primitive forms of punitive dam-
ages in their legal frameworks. 6 Historically, no distinction existed be-
tween criminal and civil law; therefore, the origin of punitive damages is
partly rooted in criminal sanctions.7 Punitive damages became a civil
remedy in English common law during the 18th century.8 New Jersey
was the first state to recognize the doctrine in 1791, and the Supreme
Court declared it "a well established principle of common law" in 1851.9
The concept of punitive damages has two main justifications, but
only one is operative today. First, punitive damages developed as a form
of retribution for non-tangible losses, such as embarrassment, humilia-
tion, or mental anguish.'0 This "compensatory" rationale no longer holds
weight because American courts now recognize damages for psychologi-
cal injuries.1 The second justification for punitive damages is punish-
ment and deterrence. 12  The Supreme Court "has long made clear that
'punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legiti-
mate interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion.", 1 3  Several commentators assert that punitive damages do not
achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence,' 4 and others argue for
stricter constitutional constraints on punitive damages.' 5 Questions about
whether punitive damages are theoretically sound or constitutional are
6. Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 104-05
(1995).
7. George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Makram B. Jaber, Further Progress in Defining Constitu-
tional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punishments, 61 Bus. LAW. 517, 521
n.21 (2006).
8. Calnan, supra note 6, at 106.
9. Id. at 108-09.
10. Id. at 108.
11. Id. at 116-17.
12. Id. at 116.
13. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
14. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 336 (1998) ("Punitive damages generate no
statistically significant deterrent effects, but the unpredictable chance of catastrophic losses can
generate substantial harm."); Calnan, supra note 6, at 110-16.
15. See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application
of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 667, 677 (1988) (arguing that punitive dam-
age awards which are disproportionate to the injury violate the Excessive Fines Clause); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 140
(1986) (contending that repeated punitive awards for one harm contravene the Excessive Fines
Clause); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Proce-
dures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 272-73 (1983) (contending that punitive damages should be constrained
by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments).
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beyond the scope of the present article, though the topic generates much
scholarly discussion. 16
B. Precedents from the Supreme Court Regarding Punitive Damages
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to punitive damages or
prohibit their imposition.' 7  The Eighth Amendment restricts the gov-
ernment from imposing "excessive fines," but this clause does not apply
to punitive damages.' 8 In Ingraham v. Wright,19 "the Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment does not limit non-criminal punishments, 20
and in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelko Disposal, Inc.,21 the Court
held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not constrain awards in cases
between private parties.22 Because punitive damages are inherently a
punishment and not subject to the same constraints as criminal sanctions,
the imposition of punitive damages "increases [the Court's] concerns
over the imprecise manner in which punitive damage systems are admin-
istered. 23
As a result, the Court recently turned to the Fourteenth Amendment
to rein in punitive damage awards using both procedural and substantive
limits. 24 The restriction of punitive damage awards is a relatively new
phenomenon. Before 1994, the Court held only one punitive damage
award to be excessive.25 It gave deference to jury awards unless they
were "the product of bias or passion" or "lack[ed] the basic elements of
fundamental fairness., 26 After 1994, the Rehnquist Court began inter-
preting the Due Process Clause to restrict punitive damage awards.27
These interpretations make judicial review of punitive damages awards
obligatory, 28 and that review must be de novo.29 Justice Scalia and com-
mentators criticize this level of review because it does not accord enough
deference to the traditional functions of the jury.30 Regardless, the juris-
16. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REv.
957, 983 (2007); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 passim
(2005).
17. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII; Chapman, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
19. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
20. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143 (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667-68).
21. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
22. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1143 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 275).
23. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
24. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062-63 (2007) ("[T]his Court has found
that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive
damages and to amounts forbidden as 'grossly excessive."').
25. Chapman, supra note 1, at 1144.
26. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 276).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,432 (1994).
29. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001).
30. Id. at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("And I was of the view that we should review for
abuse of discretion (rather than de novo) .... ); see, e.g., Chapman, supra note 1, at 1149-56 (argu-
ing that judicial review for punitive damage awards should be stricter than de novo).
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prudence over the last two decades has increased the scrutiny on punitive
damage awards through procedural due process protections.
The Court also imposed substantive due process limitations when an
award was "grossly excessive" in relation to the state's interest. 31 In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,32 the majority opinion fashioned
three guideposts to determine when an award is "grossly excessive": (1)
the degree of reprehensibility [of the conduct]; (2) the disparity between
the harm or potential harm and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties in
comparable cases.33 The Court further elaborated on these guideposts in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.34 It empha-
sized that the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is the
most important guidepost.35 In determining reprehensibility, a jury can-
not consider "lawful out-of-state conduct" when determining punish-
ment;3 6 however, the Court hinted such conduct would be admissible if it
"demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's ac-
tion in the State where it is tortious" and has a "nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff., 37 The Court added that punitive damages
should not be based on "dissimilar acts," but rather on "conduct that
harmed the plaintiff., 38 Further, in reference to the second guidepost, the
Court stated single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with the
Due Process Clause.39
C. Foreshadowing the Dispute in Philip Morris
In State Farm, the Court prohibited a punitive damage award when
based on the defendant's "lawful out-of-state conduct" or "dissimilar
acts. ' 4° The case left open the possibility, however, that the defendant
could be assessed punitive damages for similar acts done against others
within the same jurisdiction. The Court recognized in BMW that "re-
peated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance.'"4 The damage calculation in BMW lends additional sup-
port for including third-party harm in a punitive damage award. The
majority opinion hinted in a footnote that a proper calculation would be
the multiplication of damages per vehicle with the number of occur-
rences within that jurisdiction (i.e., Alabama).42  By inference, a jury
31. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
32. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
33. Id. at 576.
34. 538 U.S. 408, 419-29 (2003).
35. Id. at 419.
36. Id. at 422.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 422-23.
39. Id. at 425.
40. Id. at 422.
41. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996).
42. Id. at 567 n. 11.
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could base its award on similar actions against third parties within the
same jurisdiction.4
This inference is at odds with the dicta in State Farm. There, the
Court stated: "Due Process does not permit courts, in calculation of puni-
tive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of a reprehensibility
analysis .... ," The question becomes how to treat third-party harm in a
punitive damage calculation. One notion is that a jury can consider simi-
lar reprehensible conduct within the same jurisdiction. The competing
notion is that allowing the jury to consider third-party harm would vio-
late the defendant's due process rights.
II. PHILIP MORRIS USA v. WILLIAMS
A. Facts
Mayola Williams, on behalf of her deceased husband, sued Philip
Morris on negligence and deceit claims.45 Mr. Williams was a heavy
cigarette smoker, and he favored Marlboro cigarettes, a brand manufac-
tured by Philip Morris. 46 A jury found that: smoking caused William's
death; Williams smoked partly because he thought it was safe to do so;
and Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that it was
safe to smoke.47 With regard to the deceit claim, the jury awarded
$821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive dam-
ages.48
B. Procedural Posture
After reviewing the jury verdict, the trial judge decreased the puni-
tive damage award because it was "excessive." 49 The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed the trial judge's decision and reinstated the jury ver-
dict. 50 Philip Morris appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, which de-
clined to hear the case, and then Philip Morris sought review in the U.S.
Supreme Court.51 Certiorari was granted, and a short opinion remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of State Farm (which imposed new
constraints on punitive damage awards, especially ones which involve
greater than single-digit multipliers of the compensatory damages).52 On
remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals kept the jury verdict intact even
43. Id.
44. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
45. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060 (2007).
46. Id.





52. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003); see State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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though the punitive damage award was nearly 100 times the compensa-
tory damage award.53 Philip Morris then successfully petitioned the Ore-
gon Supreme Court for certiorari.54
The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed two issues: (1) the trial
court's rejection of a jury instruction about third-party harm;55 and (2)
the overall constitutionality of the size of the punitive damage award.56
Regarding the first issue, Philip Morris argued that it was reversible error
to reject the jury instruction, which explained that punitive damages can-
not punish the defendant for alleged misconduct to others. 7 This jury
instruction would have countered the plaintiffs argument, which asked
jurors:
[T]o "think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years
there have been .... In Oregon, how many people do we see out-
side, driving home ... smoking cigarettes? .... Cigarettes ... are
going to kill ten [of every hundred]. [And] the market share of Marl-
boros is one-third."
58
The second issue was whether the punitive damage award was
"grossly excessive" in light of the recent due process limitations an-
nounced in State Farm.59 The punitive damages award was about 100
times greater than the compensatory damages. 60 An award with this ratio
triggered heightened scrutiny because of due process concerns. 6 1 The
Oregon Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the punitive damage award
because, in its opinion, it comported with the existing due process limita-
tions.62
53. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
54. Id.
55. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171-72 (Or. 2006). The Oregon Supreme
Court phrased the first issue: "Is a defendant entitled to have the jury instructed that any award of
punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the plaintiff and that
punitive damages cannot be imposed for alleged harm to non-parties?" Id.
56. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court phrased the second issue: "Are the punitive damages
assessed in this case unconstitutionally excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?" Id.
57. Id. at 1175. The tendered jury instruction stated:
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to
Jesse Williams by the defendant's punishable misconduct. Although you may consider
the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that reasonable relationship is,
you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other per-
sons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims
and award punitive damages for those harms, as such other juries see fit.
Id.
58. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061 (alteration in original).
59. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1171-72.
60. Id. at 1171.
61. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (holding there is a
presumption against a 145-to-i ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages).
62. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1182.
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C. Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on essentially the same
issues the Oregon Supreme Court addressed.63 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Breyer, started its analysis by reaffirming the validity
of punitive damages.6 4 Also, it reviewed the substantive and procedural
limits in recent history, including the three BMW guideposts.65 In finding
for Philip Morris, the Court created a new due process limit to punitive
66damages. The majority opinion held "the Constitution's Due Process
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a de-
fendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties .... ,,67
The rule had three rationales. First, the Due Process Clause "pro-
hibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that
individual with 'an opportunity to present every available defense."' 68 A
defendant, despite its unsavory actions in one suit, retains the right to
challenge other claims as they arise.69 In other suits, it is possible that
Philip Morris would be less culpable (e.g., plaintiff knew smoking was
dangerous but continued anyway) or would have caused a lower degree
of harm (e.g., a chronic disease as opposed to death).
The second rationale was that "to permit punishment for injuring a
nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive
damage equation. ' '70 In essence, the plaintiffs position would lead to
speculation about the number of victims, the magnitude of harm, and the
circumstances surrounding other cases. A jury would be forced to specu-
late about third-party cases, magnifying the risks of arbitrariness, uncer-
tainty, and lack of notice.7
Finally, the Court could not find any precedent supporting the use
of punitive damages for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harm-
ing others. 72 No Supreme Court case had explicitly recognized this prin-
ciple.73 Some lower courts, however, had incorporated the "total harm
principle" into decisions and allowed a punitive damage award to be
based on the "impact of [the defendant's conduct] on the whole of soci-
ety.' 74  The Court did not recognize these lower court decisions and
63. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
64. Id. at 1062.
65. Id. at 1062-63.
66. Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, 43 TRIAL 72, 72 (2007).
67. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (emphasis omitted).




72. Id. But see id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Colby, supra note 5, at 650 (alteration in original) (quoting Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974)).
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treated punitive damages as an individual rather than a collective pun-
ishment.75
If the majority opinion stopped there, the rule would have been rela-
tively straightforward. The opinion went on to hold, nonetheless, that
"[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff ... was particularly reprehensible ....
Thus, evidence regarding a defendant's harm to nonparties can indirectly
enter the damage calculation if it speaks to the reprehensibility of the
defendant's actions.
The inquiry then becomes whether the jury is properly guided. The
Due Process Clause requires the courts to provide "assurance" that juries
are not asking the wrong question.77 If a judge does not properly steer
the jury away from punishing a defendant for harm caused to strangers,
the judgment could be overturned.78 The Court did not provide guidance
regarding what "assurance" would be sufficient. Instead, it left that issue
to the state courts and legislatures.79 Thus, the Court handed off the task
of fleshing out this new principle of law to the "laboratory of the
,,80states.
D. Dissenting Opinions
Three dissenting opinions expressed a wide range of disagreement
with the 5-4 majority decision.81  First, Justice Thomas adhered to his
longstanding view that "the Constitution does not constrain the size of
punitive damage awards. 82 He maintained that no due process limita-
tions ever existed to circumscribe the jury's discretion to impose punitive
damages. 83 For support, Justice Thomas cited Justice Scalia's dissent in
BMW, which suggested the phrase "due process of law" in the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates customary English common law procedures
including, presumably, jury-assessed punitive damages. 84 In previous
cases, both Justices Thomas and Scalia expressed "originalist" interpreta-
75. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
76. Id. at 1064.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1065.
79. Id.
80. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country."); see David C. Mangan, Gonzales v. Raich: The "States as Laboratories" Principle
of Federalism Supports Prolonging California 's Experiment, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 521, 543 (2007)
(applying the "states as laboratories" principle in a Commerce Clause context).
81. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065-69.
82. Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 1067-68.
84. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599-600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia 's Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdic-
tion. The Illusion ofAdjudication without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 992 (1992).
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tions of the Due Process Clause.8 5 Conspicuously, Justice Scalia chose
not to add his voice to Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion, which sug-
gests he is giving stare decisis effect to the court's decisions in Gore and
State Farm. 
86
Justice Ginsburg's opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined, challenged the application of the Supreme Court's new rule. She
argued that the Court could find no support that the jury inappropriately
considered third-party harm. 7 She would have deferred to the Oregon
Supreme Court's judgment that "the jury, in assessing the reprehensibil-
ity of Philip Morris 's actions, could consider evidence of similar harm to
other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct. 88 The
majority opinion identified no evidence or instruction that suggested the
jury considered third-party harm beyond the scope of reprehensibility.89
Further, she chided the majority for not discussing the propriety of Philip
Morris's alternative jury instruction.9" In her opinion, a well-meaning
judge would resist giving the jury instruction because it is confusing. 91
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens would permit pu-
nitive damages to punish the defendant for the total public harm caused
rather than for the reprehensible conduct in an individualized case.9 2 He
emphasized that punitive damages, much like criminal sanctions, are a
punishment for the public harm caused by the defendant. 93 Additionally,
he disapproved of the majority's distinction between appropriate and
inappropriate usage of third-party evidence. To him, taking into account
third-party harm to assess reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
amounts to the same as punishing the defendant "directly.,
94
III. ANALYSIS
Philip Morris represents another effort by the Court to constrain
substantial punitive damage awards. Justice Scalia called the Court's
recent jurisprudence on punitive damages "insusceptible of principled
application." 95 This latest expansion of Due Process to punitive damages
is along the same lines. The majority opinion identified two key ideas
that must be reconciled. First, harm to others shows a higher degree of
85. See, e.g., BMWofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Jeff Bleich ET AL., Smoke Signals: Philip Morris Provides Yet Another Chapter in the
Ongoing Saga of Punitive Damages in the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 OR. ST. BAR. BULLETIN. 24, 28
(2007). But see Greenberger, supra note 84, at 992.
87. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177 (Or. 2006) (emphasis added).
89. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court identifies no
evidence introduced and no charge delivered inconsistent with that inquiry.").
90. Id. at 1068-69.
91. Id. at 1069.
92. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1067.
95. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reprehensible conduct and warrants a stiffer penalty.96 At the same time,
that punitive damage awards cannot repeatedly punish the defendant for
the same instance of misconduct. 97  In balancing these two concepts,
Justice Breyer created a distinction 98 that breaks down in practice. 99 Fur-
thermore, the majority's ruling will likely confuse the lower courts and
does not fully solve the problems the Court attempted to address. A
much better rule would allow evidence of the defendant's harm to third-
parties only if the behavior has been fully litigated. Such a rule would
allow a defendant to challenge each individual claim on the merits and
would eliminate the need for drawing confusing distinctions about how
such evidence is used.
A. The Court Attempts to Balance Two Competing Principles
As in the criminal law context, the Court here identified two com-
peting concepts for determining punishment. First, repeated offenses
merit tougher punishment. 1 ° This concept has its roots in criminal
law.0 Repeated misconduct is inherently worse than the initial offense
because the defendant continued the illegal conduct despite being previ-
ously punished; therefore, a stiffer sentence is necessary to deter the
criminal behavior. Thus, the sentencing court may consider the defen-
dant's prior wrongful acts 1 2 for the purpose of determining the reprehen-
sibility of the charged crime.10 3 Following this principle, a heightened
punishment for repeated offenses is not unconstitutional on double jeop-
ardy grounds. Recidivism statutes can take into account other instances
of misconduct by the criminal defendant. 0 4 Consideration of repeated
misconduct does not impose an additional penalty, but is rather a stiff-
ened penalty for the latest crime. 0 5 In a punitive damages context, the
Court has recognized the principle that "repeated misconduct is more
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."'
10 6
96. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
97. Id. at 1065.
98. Id. at 1064 (stating it is permissible to use third-party harm to determine reprehensibility,
but not permissible to base an award on it).
99. Bleich ET. AL., supra note 86, at 27 ("The Court drew [a] slender line as follows: a plain-
tiff can use evidence of actual harm to non-parties to help 'show that the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehen-
sible,' but could not use that evidence to 'punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is al-
leged to have visited on nonparties."').
100. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400
(1995)).
101. Freeman & Jaber, supra note 7, at 521 n.21.
102. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (citing Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 244-52 (1949)).
103. Witte, 515 U.S. at 400.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996).
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A second principle holds that a defendant once punished for an ille-
gal act should not suffer additional retribution for that conduct.'0 7 Since
there is no double jeopardy equivalent in punitive damages,'0 8 the Court
was aware of the possibility that a punitive damage award could "double
count."'1 9 The Court provided some protection for this contingency: "A
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff,
not for being an unsavory individual or business." 110 The Court appro-
priately raised a concern that defendants should not repeatedly pay for a
particular instance of tortious behavior.11' If a company pays the total
damages it owes to society repeatedly, the company overcompensates
society for the actual damages.
1 12
B. In Balancing These Principles, the Court Adopts a Senseless Rule
The dilemma in Philip Morris captures the tension between stiff-
ened penalties for repeated misconduct and double punishment concerns.
As a solution, the majority opinion attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween appropriate and inappropriate treatment of a defendant's harm to
third-parties. 1 13 The Court considered Philip Morris's behavior towards
other smokers as relevant to a punitive damage calculation when it dem-
onstrated reprehensibility. 14 In other words, a jury could find repeated
misbehavior more deserving of punishment than a fluke incident. In
contrast, a court cannot justify a punishment solely or partly on Philip
Morris's actions to third parties because each claim should be litigated
independently to avoid double punishment.
This distinction breaks down in practice. Justice Stevens criticized
this distinction using an example in criminal law:
A murderer who kills his victim by throwing a bomb that injures
dozens of bystanders should be punished more severely than one who
harms no one other than his intended victim. Similarly, there is no
reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging
in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and addictive sub-
stance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide should not include
consideration of the harm to those "bystanders" as well as the harm
to the individual plaintiff. 
115
107. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007).
108. Colby, supra note 5, at 597 (discussing res judicata as the seemingly equivalent to double
jeopardy but not applying in punitive damage situations because it can only bind litigants that were
actually parties to the prior dispute).
109. BMW, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,423 (2003) (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. See Colby, supra note 5, at 660.
113. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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This argument emphasizes that harm to third parties is inextricably
linked to reprehensibility. Thus, it is illogical to draw a distinction be-
tween directly punishing the defendant for harm to third parties and indi-
rectly considering such harm in a reprehensibility analysis.
This logical breakdown can be seen in another way, through the
eyes of jurors. After a jury decides that the defendant deserves a punitive
sanction, many factors will enter the equation about what amount is ap-
propriate. Jurors will likely consider the factors identified in BMW, 16
such as the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. When a jury
considers these factors, it makes little difference whether evidence of
third-party harm enters the equation under the guise of reprehensibility.
Once that evidence is in the jury's hands, jurors will do whatever they
want with it; the bell cannot be rung. In effect, the Court removes one
avenue to consider such evidence (i.e., it would lead a jury to punish the
defendant for harm to nonparties) while leaving another passageway
wide open (i.e., it shows reprehensible conduct). It only matters how the
lawyer frames the argument to make the evidence admissible.
C. The Philip Morris Rule Will Be Difficult to Apply
The majority opinion provided no guidance regarding how a court
can prevent a jury from improperly punishing a defendant for harm to
nonparties. The Court indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
states "to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong ques-
tion."' 1 7 This standard is vague. The Court gave no suggestion about
what assurances would be permissible. 1 8 Certainly, a jury instruction
like the one Philip Morris submitted might be appropriate. But, as the
dissent pointed out, "[t]he Court ventures no opinion on the propriety of
the charge proposed by Philip Morris . . ,,119 Even if the judge issued
instructions that correctly explained the proper treatment of third-party
harm, the jury is unlikely to heed the instructions. Empirical evidence
suggests juries have a low level of comprehension, recall, and application
of the judge's instructions in punitive damage scenarios.
120
Additionally, jury instructions that are in accordance with Philip
Morris may confuse the jury and lead to erroneous verdicts. The purpose
of jury instructions, in part, is to elucidate the applicable law. The Ore-
116. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996).
117. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
118. Id. at 1065 ("Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of proce-
dures they will implement, federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protec-
tion in appropriate cases.").
119. Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 223 (2002) ("Our
empirical studies demonstrate that jury instruction do not play a governing role in jurors' decisions
concerning liability for punitive damages."). Cf John L. Kane, Giving Trials a Second Look, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 738, 739 (jury instructions have become increasingly useless because appellate
courts emphasize legally precise pronouncements over frank, natural language) (drawing, in part,
from LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 399 (2d ed. 1985) (1973)).
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gon Supreme Court correctly criticized Philip Morris's jury instructions:
"it is unclear to us how a jury could 'consider' harm to others, yet with-
hold that consideration from the punishment calculus."' 12' The seemingly
contradictory jury instructions could induce jurors to come to opposite
conclusions.
Justice Breyer's answer to this criticism creates a perplexing stan-
dard of review for jury instructions. He reasons that although a court
cannot ultimately determine if the instructions confused the jury, it must
prevent "procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of
any such confusion occurring.' 2 2  This statement does not clarify how
this principle would operate in practice. Because the Court declined to
analyze what jury instructions would be constitutionally permissible,
"the ruling will engender enormous confusion in the lower
courts . . ,,12' Additionally, if the jury is perplexed, it might refrain
from considering the defendant's harm to others altogether, which would
be an incorrect application of the law since the jury can consider repre-
hensibility as a component of the damage award.
124
D. An Alternative Rule: A Jury May Consider Third-Party Harm Only
from Previously-Litigated Cases
In Philip Morris, the Court struck down a punitive damage amount
"based not on what the jury had awarded, but how the jury had reached
its decision."' 125 Traditionally, a jury possessed broad discretion to award
punitive damages and courts did not peer into the jury's "black box" to
determine how the decisions were made.' 26 This virtually unlimited dis-
cretion, however, must yield to constitutional concerns about decision
makers' caprice. 127  Justice Breyer cautioned against allowing an un-
elected jury with little experience to essentially create its own public
policy in awarding punitive damages. 28 If jurors are not to act as policy
makers, the next questions are whether and how a court can ensure a jury
applies the law. Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that jury
instructions have a low impact on how juries compute punitive damage
awards. 129 This research suggests it is much less effective to direct a jury
on how to use certain evidence than it is to prevent the jury from hearing
121. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
122. Id.
123. Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 74.
124. See id.
125. Bleich ET AL., supra note 86, at 26.
126. See generally Chapman, supra note 1, at 1122-32.
127. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[O]ne cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators
through the ballot box; nor can one expect those jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within
a discipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and
application of the law. Yet here Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or
judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy .... ").
129. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 120, at 223 ("The empirical findings demonstrate the low
level of comprehension, recall, and application of the judge's instruction by both jurors and juries.").
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that evidence altogether. With that concern in mind, this section formu-
lates a rule about how a court should treat evidence relating to third-party
harm in punitive damage cases. This rule focuses on the defendant's
conduct towards the plaintiff, yet also allows a jury to consider limited
evidence about harm to third parties when addressing reprehensibility.
1. A Suggestion for Considering Third-Party Harm: The Prior Ad-
judication Rule
The Prior Adjudication Rule holds that trial courts should allow evi-
dence of a defendant's similar harm to third parties in the same jurisdic-
tion if that conduct has been adjudicated to its conclusion with a finding
against the defendant.
A plaintiffs evidence must satisfy three requirements to warrant
jury consideration: (1) the conduct towards a third party was a "similar
harm;" (2) it occurred in the "same jurisdiction;" and (3) the claim has
been "adjudicated to its completion against the defendant." Each of
these components is based on the Supreme Court's recent punitive dam-
age jurisprudence or analogous aspects of the law.
130
"Similar harm" is a critical component because it allows a jury to
factor recidivism into a punitive damage award. Among other factors,
31
recidivism justifies a higher punitive damage award because it speaks to
reprehensibility. 132 To justify punishment based on recidivism, "courts
must ensure the conduct in question replicates the prior transgres-
sions."' 33 As an example of how this principle would operate in Philip
Morris, the punitive damage award from another case would be admissi-
ble where the plaintiff developed emphysema because of the company's
misrepresentation of the dangers from smoking. Inherently, this standard
will require the discretion of the trial judge based on the circumstances of
each case.
130. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (prohibiting a state
from imposing punitive damages without first providing an opportunity to provide every available
defense); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that states do
not have legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct outside its jurisdiction); BMW of N. Am.,
517 U.S. at 576-77 (finding that repeated actions are more reprehensible than isolated incident);
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 438 (1995) (permitting evidence of related criminal conduct to
enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime).
131. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 409 ("We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility
of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.").
132. BMW ofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 577 ("Our holdings that a recidivist may be punished more
severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an
individual instance of malfeasance.").
133. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
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The "same jurisdiction" criterion avoids the state sovereignty con-
cerns expressed in State Farm. In that case, the Court, as a general rule,
declared that "the State [does not] have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed
outside of the State's jurisdiction."'' 34 The best reading of this language
is that the principle of state sovereignty provides an independent consti-
tutional constraint on punitive damage awards. 135  Although this rule
allows for exceptions, 136 the safer course to be within constitutional
bounds it is to exclude any consideration of illegal conduct in other juris-
dictions. Note that, under the proposed rule, the same jurisdiction re-
striction applies only to a defendant's harm to third parties, not to its
general course of conduct. The Philip Morris Court indicated that
"[l]awful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberativeness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State
where it is tortious .... Therefore, the proposed rule permits a plain-
tiff to present evidence about a company's general practices to establish
whether a tortious act occurred, but the plaintiff cannot allege that those
practices harmed any other individual besides herself unless the other
requirements are met.
The final criterion is that the third-party harm "be adjudicated to its
completion against the defendant.' 38 Punitive damages require that the
plaintiff satisfy the underlying cause of action for compensatory dam-
ages. 139 Each individual's claim may fail for a number of reasons (e.g.,
the absence of causation, contributory negligence, or the statute of limita-
tions); therefore, it would violate due process if the defendant did not
have the opportunity to refute each individual claim.1 40  Even in class
action lawsuits, the jury must still determine for each class member
whether he or she was injured, and, if so, whether the defendant caused
that injury. 14 1 The concept of punitive damages cannot be unmoored
from its tradition as a punishment for private rather than public wrongs.
Justice Breyer raised this concern in Philip Morris: a defendant should
have an opportunity to present every available defense in each individual
action.1 42 The proposed rule addresses this concern. In previously adju-
134. Id. at 421.
135. Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2004).
136. The language "as a general rule" suggests that exceptions may exist. See State Farm, 538
U.S. at 421; see also Allen, supra note 135, at 27 ("[T]he Court did not adopt a bright-line rule that a
state can never have a constitutionally legitimate interest in punishing a defendant for or deterring it
from engaging in unlawful acts done outside that state. Instead, the Court described its decision in
this regard as a 'general rule.' The Court does not tell us what situation might justify an exception to
the general rule.").
137. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.
138. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).
139. Colby, supra note 5, at 652-63.
140. ld. at 651-52.
141. Id. at 655.
142. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
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dicated cases, the defendant had an opportunity to assert the applicable
defenses, thus satisfying due process considerations. 1
43
2. Comparison of the Prior Adjudication Rule to the Supreme Court
Rule
a. Consideration of Recidivism in Reprehensibility Analysis
The Prior Adjudication Rule requires a stronger connection between
third-party harm and recidivism before the jury may consider such evi-
dence. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, a plaintiff may present evi-
dence of third-party harm only if it meets the requirements of similar
harm, same jurisdiction, and prior adjudication.144  These requirements
are a heavy burden because they address a compilation of the due process
concerns in State Farm, BMW, and Philip Morris.145  Combined, these
requirements strengthen the likelihood that a jury is considering evidence
that speaks to recidivism and, by extension, a higher degree of reprehen-
sibility. 146  The Supreme Court's rule is more inclusive of third-party
evidence but lends itself to a greater chance of a jury misusing that evi-
dence. 147 For example, the Court would allow a plaintiff to present the
defendant's harm to nonparties in order to show that the conduct posed a
substantial risk to the general public.148 In contrast, the Prior Adjudica-
tion Rule would ban such evidence. 149  Because the Supreme Court's
threshold for admitting third-party evidence is lower, the jury will have
more opportunities to consider allegations rather than court-certified
findings of previous misconduct.
b. Protecting Defendants from a Jury's Reliance on Unproven
Misconduct
With regard to the policy goal of protecting defendants from a
jury's reliance on unproven misconduct, the Prior Adjudication Rule
provides additional safeguards. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, the
143. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934) ("It is enough that all available
defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax and before the com-
mand of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable.").
144. See supra Part III.D. 1.
145. Id.
146. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996) ("Our holdings that a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.") (citing Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728,
732 (1948)).
147. See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063-64 ("Respondent argues that she is free to show
harm to other victims because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional
equation, namely, reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.
Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate
reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was
particularly reprehensible . .
148. Id.
149. See supra Part III.D. 1.
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defendant would necessarily have an opportunity to assert the applicable
defenses either in previous cases or the case at bar. 150 By definition, a
past adjudication provides some measure of protection that the defen-
dants had an opportunity to present every available defense. 151 In con-
trast, the Supreme Court's rule is weaker. The jury may still consider
third-party evidence so long as the judge properly directs the jury.'
52
Under the Supreme Court's ruling, a jury could still rely on evidence
where the defendant has not received an opportunity to address the mer-
its of the third-party claim.'53
c. Practical Considerations
The Prior Adjudication Rule and the Supreme Court's ruling differ
in the ease of administration and the impact on future litigation. The
Supreme Court's ruling is unclear about which procedural protections
would ensure that the jury is not punishing a defendant for harm to non-
litigants. 54 As a result, the majority's opinion will foster litigation to
flesh out this new principle of law.155 In comparison, the Prior Adjudica-
tion Rule shifts the question from what procedures adequately protect a
defendant to whether third-party harm is admissible. The Prior Adjudi-
cation Rule relies heavily on factual inquiries, which are easier to deter-
mine than an amorphous inquiry into whether a procedure "create[s] an
unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring."',
56
Further, the Prior Adjudication Rule will discourage litigation because a
defendant may be more likely to settle knowing that a punitive damage
award would be admissible in later lawsuits.
3. Potential Drawbacks of the Prior Adjudication Rule
a. The Rule Raises the Evidentiary Threshold Higher than a
Criminal Proceeding
A curious consequence of the Prior Adjudication Rule is that it
would restrict evidence in punitive damage cases further than a criminal
sentencing proceeding. Under the Prior Adjudication Rule, a plaintiff
could present third-party harm evidence only if a court previously found
150. See id.
151. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934).
152. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 ("Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned,
it is constitutionally important for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right ques-
tion, not the wrong one.").
153. See id. at 1065. The Supreme Court would allow evidence where the defendant has not
asserted defenses to individual claims: "we recognize that conduct that risks harm to many is likely
more reprehensible that conduct that risks harm to only a few. And a jury consequently may take
this fact into account in determining reprehensibility." Id.
154. See id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court ventures no opinion on the propriety
of the charge proposed by Philip Morris ....").
155. Cf Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 74 ("The decision [in Philip Morris] is sufficiently
unclear that it is difficult to figure out what it means.").
156. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.
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the defendant liable for similar conduct.' 57  In stark contrast, criminal
courts may consider previously uncharged conduct"' and even conduct
for which the defendant was acquitted in a sentencing proceeding.1 59 A
foreseeable criticism of the Prior Adjudication Rule is that it places a
higher emphasis on a court's findings than does the criminal law, where
a person's life or liberty is at stake.
A response to this criticism maintains that punitive damages operate
similarly to criminal sanctions, and the law should make no distinction
between procedural protections for monetary and non-monetary sanc-
tions. Justice O'Connor referred to punitive damages as "quasi-criminal"
and suggested that heightened procedural safeguards are therefore appli-
cable:
[P]unitive damages are quasi-criminal punishment. Unlike compen-
satory damages, which serve to allocate an existing loss between two
parties, punitive damages are specifically designed to exact punish-
ment in excess of actual harm to make clear that the defendant's mis-
conduct was especially reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma at-
tached to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a
purely compensatory award. The punitive character of punitive dam-
ages means that there is more than just money at stake. This factor
militates in favor of strong procedural safeguards.
160
Because punitive damages involve a public expression of condemnation
and the goals of punishment/deterrence, they should be subject to the
same procedural safeguards as criminal sanctions.161 Strikingly, the due
process concerns the Court raises in Philip Morris have not taken root in
the criminal context. 162 Many commentators criticize the current level of
procedural protections for defendants at sentencing because it allows for
the possibility that an innocent person may serve enhanced sentences for
157. See supra Part IID. 1.
158. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1995).
159. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997).
160. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2006) ("Exemplary damages ... shall only
be awarded in a civil action when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the
commission of a wrong..."); Cf Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death Is Different, '" Is Money Different?
Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 217, 272 (2003) ("Unless there are compelling
reasons for distinguishing among the sanctions of death, terms of imprisonment, forfeitures, and
punitive damages awards, the method for evaluating their excessiveness or disproportionality should
be consistent.").
162, See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the
Subsequent Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 733-34 (1994) ("Even though facts
found at sentencing are of great importance to the defendant, sentencing hearings remain informal
events conducted with little regard for procedural fairness or accuracy. Sentencing facts need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Con-
frontation Clause apply. And although defendants technically have a due process right to be sen-
tenced only upon reliable information, offenders are routinely condemned to spend years behind bars
on the basis of double or triple hearsay and questionable drug quantity estimates.").
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crimes, which are uncharged or dismissed. 63 Therefore, the Prior Adju-
dication Rule may not only provide fairness in a punitive damage sce-
nario, but it could also be extended to criminal cases to prevent defen-
dants from serving enhanced sentences for uncharged conduct.
b. Juries Might Still Inappropriately Consider Third-Party
Evidence
The Prior Adjudication Rule decreases, but does not eliminate the
possibility that a jury will punish the defendant for harm to third parties.
Conduct towards third parties speaks not only to how much the defendant
should be punished but also to whether the defendant committed a tort in
the first place. 164 For example, in Philip Morris, if Williams proved the
company engaged in a massive campaign that deceived the public and
that the campaign affected the deceased, the company would have com-
mitted a tort against him.1 65 Third-party evidence might still be relevant
for the "guilt-level" phase of the trial, even though a jury could poten-
tially use that evidence inappropriately at the "sentencing" phase.'66 As a
result, the trial judge must still issue an instruction about how to appro-
priately use the third-party evidence.' 67  Thus, the Prior Adjudication
Rule might be less effective in practice because third-party evidence will
still enter the jury's consideration.
In response to this criticism, the courts could turn to other rules of
evidence to prevent a jury from inappropriately considering third-party
harm. For example, Rule 404(b) would limit evidence of prior wrongs to
show propensity to commit a similar wrong.' 68 Courts have not relied on
163. Id at 764 n.31 ("The literature attacking the procedures at sentencing is extensive.")
(citing Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1994); Joseph P. Sargent, Comment, The Standard of Proof Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Raising the Standard to Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 463 (1993); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-
Finding under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 323-43 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 208-25 (1991)).
164. See Janutis, supra note 5, at 415 ("[A]n apportionment system would limit consideration
of third-party activities to only those third-party activities that bear on the defendant's state of mind
in connection with the activities directed at the injured party before the court.").
165. Syllogism: Philip Morris deceived the public; Williams is a member of the public; there-
fore, Philip Morris deceived Williams.
166. The terms "guilt-phase" and "sentencing-phase" relate to two separate aspects of a crimi-
nal case, but the model has been incorporated into civil cases. See Donald M. Houser, Reconciling
Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for
Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 352-53 (2007) (explaining that the current structure of a
capital case is bifurcated into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase). See generally State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) ("At State Farm's request the trial court bifurcated
the trial into two phases conducted before different juries. In the first phase the jury determined that
State Farm's decision not to settle was unreasonable because there was a substantial likelihood of an
excess verdict .... The second phase addressed State Farm's liability for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.").
167. See Janutis, supra note 5, at 414.
168. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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Rule 404(b) to a great extent in civil cases. 169 By its language, Rule
404(b) would seem to apply equally to both criminal and civil cases,
since "the rule is entitled 'Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts,' not simply
'Other Crimes."' 170 Regardless, the Prior Adjudication Rule stands not
just on its own, but operates within the context of other evidentiary rules
to protect a jury from misusing the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The only clear conclusion from Philip Morris is that the Supreme
Court's struggle with punitive damages will continue in the future.
171
The Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to forbid the use of puni-
tive damages to punish a defendant for an injury it inflicts upon third-
parties.' 72 This relatively simple principle becomes complicated in prac-
tice, since a plaintiff may still show the defendant's harm to third parties
demonstrates reprehensibility. 173 The Court has blocked off the highway,
but left open the scenic route. Though a jury may not "directly" punish
the defendant for harm to third parties, such evidence can indirectly enter
the equation through a backdoor reprehensibility analysis. The distinc-
tion the Court draws is likely to, at best, make little difference or, at
worst, confuse the jury. So long as the jury may consider third-party
harm, there is no guarantee it will refrain from punishing the defendant
based on the defendant's harm to nonparties, even if the judge issues a
cautionary instruction.
The future debate will likely center around what measures will sat-
isfy the due process concerns raised in Philip Morris, since the majority
opinion gave little indication. As a consequence, the Court left it to the
"laboratory of the states" to carve out this new due process protection.
174
The Prior Adjudication Rule proposed herein presents a potential solu-
tion for state legislatures and courts in their efforts to adhere to the Su-
preme Court's concerns in Philip Morris. Under the rule, a plaintiff may
present third-party harm evidence only if it is of a similar nature, in the
same jurisdiction, and following a prior adjudication. The rule balances
the competing ideas that recidivism is more reprehensible 175 and that a
plaintiff deserves the opportunity to refute each separate allegation of
misconduct.
176
169. John Gardner, Comment, Help Me Doc! Theories of Admissibility of Other Act Evidence
in Medical Malpractice Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 981, 984 (2004).
170. Id.
171. Bleich ET AL., supra note 86, at 28.
172. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).
173. Id. at 1064.
174. Palmer v. Asarco Inc., No. 03-CV-0498-CVE-PJC, 2007 WL 666592, at *1 (N.D. Okla.
Feb. 27, 2007) ("As Constitutional rights evolve, so does a state's perception of the interests of its
citizens").
175. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996).
176. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
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Regardless, state courts and legislatures will have to change the ex-
isting procedures to accommodate the Court's ruling. It remains an open
question how strongly the courts will enforce this new due process pro-
tection. The next series of litigation will likely focus on how to incorpo-
rate the principles of Philip Morris in a courtroom context.
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